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Abstract
This case study explores the interaction between domestic and foreign governmental policy
on technology transfer with the goal of exploring the long-term impacts of technology transfer.
Specifically, the impact of successive licensing of fighter aircraft manufacturing and design to
Japan in the development of Japan’s aircraft industry is reviewed. Results indicate Japan has built
a domestic aircraft industry through sequential learning with foreign technology transfers from the
United States, and design and production on domestic fighter aircraft. This process was facilitated
by governmental policies in both Japan and the United States.
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1. Introduction
The creation of the National Economic Council by President Clinton during his first term
recognized the increased importance of economic issues. The importance of national eco-
nomic policies is brought about by increased global competition and pace of technological
change. The focus on economic issues has spillover implications for national security. For
example, the US ambassador to Malaysia intervened to help save a sale of F/A-18 aircraft
that includes meeting Malaysia demands for “offsets” or technology transfer of advanced
manufacturing skills (Cole and Lubman, 1994; Mecham, 1998). This provides evidence
that nations are increasingly concerned with their economic competitive advantage, and
knowledge may be the only lasting source of competitive advantage (Hitt et al., 1998). In
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this environment, technology transfer, or the exchange of knowledge, between nations has
strategic implications for national competitiveness and security.
The rise of multinational corporations demand more sophisticated government policies,
because these policies can have a wide-ranging impact on competitiveness. As a result,
several studies have called for a greater understanding of government policy on economic
competitiveness (Ham and Mowery, 1995; Nelson, 1995; Vogel, 1996). These papers focus
largely on better understanding “US” government policy. However, multinational corpora-
tions are impacted by policies in multiple nations. A complete paradigm for understanding
the impact of government policy on technology transfer requires balancing competing do-
mestic and international political–economic interests. In other words, what are the long-term
impacts, if any, of an increased economic focus in the United States on technology transfer?
Accepting that governments play a role in international competition, home nations and
their firms may inadvertently accept greater risk when objectives motivating host and home
nation government policy are not considered together, or are assumed to be the same. When
arms sales involve offsets worth 60–100% of weapon purchases (Cole and Lubman, 1994),
government policies represent an important environmental factor that needs considered by
corporate managers and government policy makers. The present study contributes to the
process of better understanding the impact of government policy by studying the case of
US aircraft technology transfers to Japan after World War II (WWII). We compare national
policies of the United States and Japan, and the impact of each nation’s policy on technology
transfer in building an aircraft industry in Japan. The aircraft industry and its associated
technology concern governments, because it can act as a catalyst for new technologies or
have significant spillover effects (Turnipseed and Rassuli, 1999).
2. Dynamics of technology transfer
Although any technology transfer and the principals of any agreement have complex
motives, technology transfer can be viewed along a continuum framed by event or learning
perspectives. The event perspective views technology transfer primarily as an economic
transaction where one party provides technology in return for some form of payment. In
general, the United States tends to view technology transfer as an event (Olk and Xin,
1997). For example, US defense exports are motivated, in part, toward reducing the cost
of weapon system programs through extra sales (Economist, 1998). Other motivations
include maintaining common equipment with allies, and facilitating joint operations and
interchangeability of parts. A key implication of an event perspective is that it is less likely
to consider long-term implications of a transaction, and view a technology transfer as an
end in of itself.
Organizational learning provides an alternate perspective of technology transfer where
technology transfer is not an event but a process. Levitt and March (1988) stress the impor-
tance of learning by doing and suggest trial and error is how organizations develop routines
and procedures. These routines and procedures are necessary to address the large gap that
exists between obtaining knowledge and subsequently using that knowledge to create a
product. This distinction can be better understood by considering the difference between
“explicit” and “tacit” knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). Explicit knowledge can be transmitted
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in formal, systematic language. Meanwhile, tacit knowledge is harder to communicate and
is rooted in action or a specific context of a person’s experience. Japan tends to view tech-
nology transfer from a learning perspective (Hamel et al., 1998), and the aircraft industry
requires large amounts of tacit knowledge. For example, Boeing is not concerned with
patent expirations because of the high costs of reverse engineering that result from a lack
of common experience (Katz, 1998).
Although economic considerations remain, viewing technology transfer from a learning
perspective translates into Japan viewing technology transfer as a process (Olk and Xin,
1997), or a means. Japan’s process perspective contributed to its achieving industrializa-
tion and rapid economic growth after WWII (Katz, 1998). Kim (1997, pp. 230–231) called
the learning approach exhibited by Japan “creative imitation,” or a three-step process of
knowledge acquisition, assimilation, and improvement. Japan has distinguished itself from
other nations in its openness to foreign knowledge acquisition, or technology transfer (Pack,
2000). Nonaka (1994) identifies Japan as valuing the importance of experience in achieving
understanding, or knowledge assimilation. The final step in learning from technology trans-
fer is to improve the knowledge gained. Consistent with a process perspective is Japan’s
tendency to improve knowledge in part by acquiring new technology in a building block
approach. This is supported in part by Chang (1995) who found that Japanese firms follow
an expansion strategy of sequential entry.
Sequential entry into a market allows Japan to acquire knowledge and build a base of
experience that allows it to progress to improving the knowledge gained. There is evidence
that Japan’s aircraft industry followed such an approach between WWI and WWII. At the
end of WWI, Japan recognized that it needed to modernize its arms (Pelvin, 2000). The
Japanese companies of Mitsubishi, Nakajima, and Kawasaki turned to foreign assistance to
develop an aircraft industry and each developed close links with European firms to obtain
the latest technology (Pelvin, 2000).
From this inauspicious beginning, Japan by WWII was building bombers that set transo-
ceanic distance records and the “Zero” a fighter that flew farther and faster than any plane
in the US arsenal at the beginning of WWII (Shear, 1994). Although the United States
invented the first aircraft, it had lost its lead by WWII (McLarren, 1949). For our purposes,
we use a four-part framework beginning with having the skills to operate and maintain a
technology as a yardstick for measuring technological capability of an industry (see Fig. 1).
Technological capability then expands to include the sequential skills of reproducing parts,















Fig. 1. Technological capability framework.
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this research is: has Japan followed steps consistent with a learning perspective to build its
post-WWII aircraft industry through technology transfer, and has US policy facilitated this
process?
3. Government involvement
Japan was barred from having an aircraft industry from the end of WWII until 9 April
1952, by which time Japan had virtually no aircraft industry capability (Hall and John-
son, 1968). However, Japan quickly began re-building its aircraft industry as evidenced by
Mitsubishi breaking ground on an aircraft production facility in December 1952 (Jane’s,
1976). Primarily through the importation of technology, Japan re-acquired a capable air-
craft industry. A key element in that effort was government sponsorship of military aircraft
co-production programs (Hall and Johnson, 1968). The Japanese government Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) under the 1954 Arms Manufacturing Law was
given authority to regulate “weapons procurement in the nation’s industrial structure”,
and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) remains the sole fighter aircraft prime contractor
(Alexander, 1993). Japan’s government first declared aviation a “key technology” in 1954
(Alexander, 1993). Between 1952 and 1964, Japan’s government directly supported the
creation of an aircraft industry and supplied US$ 14.68 million in the financing of aircraft
industry equipment and US$ 5.23 million in R&D subsidies (Hall and Johnson, 1968). In
1958, MITI wrote the Aircraft Industrial Promotion Law that sought the successful develop-
ment of a defense aircraft industry as a means of developing a commercial aviation industry
(Shear, 1994). It is the success of this effort that is the subject of this paper.
Japanese government support for the domestic aircraft industry has remained strong over
time. In 1970, the MITI re-identified aviation as a key technology (Shear, 1994). During the
1980s, MITI reiterated its goal of penetrating the commercial aircraft industry (Turnipseed
and Rassuli, 1999). Japanese government support included policies requiring licensing
of technology from foreign firms. The impact of regulated and forced licensing includes
shifting the distribution of innovation from foreign to domestic firms by limiting ownership
of specialized assets (Teece, 1986). This makes licensing appear profitable to firms, because
other avenues are blocked by the host government (Teece, 1986). The expectation, in these
circumstances, is that licensed products will cost more than direct purchases, because a
premium will be built into the price of the license. However, analysis of early aircraft
licenses to Japan show no premium was paid (Hall and Johnson, 1968). Essentially, Japan
obtained the aircraft, related technology, and manufacturing experience at a lower price
than just buying the aircraft directly from US manufacturers.
4. Aircraft programs
We use a case study following Eisenhardt’s (1989) methodology to examine whether a
process, or learning, perspective describes technology transfers between the United States
and Japan over time. Specifically, we focus on the transfer of fighter aircraft technology
since WWII. Data on post-WWII fighter programs were collected from relevant literature
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from the 1950’s to present. Our focus on fighter aircraft technology transfers from the
end of WWII is deliberate. First, significant changes in aircraft technology after WWII
and the ensuing ban that kept Japan from having an aircraft industry presented Japan with a
situation where it was faced with re-building an aircraft industry from the ground up. Second,
Japan focused on re-building fighter aircraft industrial capability for economic and national
prestige concerns. Third, Japan’s government targeted technology transfer as a means of
re-building industrial capability in general, and fighter aircraft specifically. Fourth, fighter
aircraft represent systems that have been developed more or less continuously by the United
States for the given time period with each generation representing an advance in technology,
and often subsequent licensing of that technology to Japan and MHI (Hall and Johnson,
1968; Lorell, 1995). Finally, fighter aircraft represent a demanding type of aircraft based
on an industrial capability in which critical knowledge is tacit in nature.
Evidence to support a learning perspective by Japan toward technology transfer requires
identifying the changing level of Japan’s domestic aircraft industry capability, and changes
in the diffusion rate of technology from the United States to Japan over time. We attempt
to support such a conclusion by looking at several characteristics of aircraft technology
transfers. First, Japan’s domestic capability is measured as the number of aircraft initially
assembled in Japan from parts produced in the United States. The fewer aircraft merely
assembled in Japan should indicate an increased capability to operate, maintain, and re-
produce related technology. These skills relate to the first two levels of our technological
capability framework that involve the ability to operate and maintain technology and then
the ability to reproduce parts.
Additionally, changes in the domestic content of fighter aircraft produced in Japan, when
available, are reported. Second, the rate technology diffuses is measured as the time between
a fighter aircraft achieves initial operational capability (IOC), in the United States, to when
Japan first produces the same fighter aircraft domestically as measured in years. A faster
diffusion of technology from the United States to Japan would indicate a narrowing gap
in industrial capability. Finally, Japan’s domestic capability in supporting industrial base is
measured by identifying capabilities for fighter aircraft subsystems.
To develop the background needed to evaluate these characteristics, the Japanese fighter
aircraft programs, including US licensed production and domestic development, are de-
scribed in the following sections. Considering only fighter aircraft production of US li-
censed designs would distort the picture of Japan’s evolving aircraft industry capability, so
indigenous Japanese fighter programs are also reviewed. Japan has domestically designed
and produced two fighter aircraft, since WWII, the Mitsubishi F-1 and F-2. The domestic
fighter aircraft programs also help demonstrate the last levels of industry capability in our
framework adapting and creating technology. A montage of the fighter aircraft reviewed in
the following subparagraphs is shown in Fig. 2.
4.1. North American F-86 Sabre
Japan’s involvement with the F-86 aircraft is one of evolution, and it began at the level
of operating and maintaining technology. Between 1952 and 1954, Japanese industry fo-
cused on repair and overhaul work on the F-86 aircraft for the Japanese Air Self-Defense













Fig. 2. Montage of fighter aircraft programs reviewed.
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was selected for licensed production of the F-86 aircraft (Jane’s, 1968). By 1956, Japan
produced its first domestically assembled F-86 (Jane’s, 1957). By 1969, Japan’s Mitsubishi
had delivered 300 F-86 aircraft to its armed forces with 77% domestic content (Todd and
Simpson, 1986). However, the first 70 F-86 aircraft were essentially produced in the United
States and assembled in Japan (Hall and Johnson, 1967). Still F-86 licensed production
extended Japan’s aircraft industry to at least the level of reproducing parts.
The progression in Japan’s capability resulted largely from imitation. During 1956, a
group of MHI officials spent several months at North American’s Los Angeles plant, and
the group later reproduced everything down to the color of paint in tool rooms in Japan (Hall
and Johnson, 1968). Japan also used what it had learned to innovate. For example, MHI
developed a new and ingenious way to produce Monahan hinges, a portion of the airframe
that posed problems for North American (Hall and Johnson, 1968). Further, Japanese ex-
perience with co-production on the F-86’s air brakes had a powerful residual effect on the
civilian economy, when that technology was applied to Japan’s revolutionary bullet train
(Shear, 1994). This provides examples of Japan progressing, at a minimum, to adapting
technology. Japanese learning also increased their absorptive capacity for future technol-
ogy transfers. For example, during the initial stages of the F-86 program, MHI’s design
group spent 70% of their time converting drawings and specifications into Japanese and the
metric system, but this experience allowed MHI to use drawings for the F-104J program
without translation (Hall and Johnson, 1968).
4.2. Lockheed F-104 Starfighter
On 7 November 1959, MHI was notified it would be the prime contractor for Japanese
production of the F-104J aircraft (Hall and Johnson, 1968). MHI was given exclusive rights
to sell the F-104J, but only to the Japanese government (Hall and Johnson, 1968). A sig-
nificant design effort was carried out in both the United States and Japan to modify the
F-104C into the F-104J (Hall and Johnson, 1968). Examples of F-104 technology gained
under license production include chemical milling, a spray mat process to control icing,
and improved techniques for the high-heat treatment of steel (Todd and Simpson, 1986).
MHI produced a total of 203 F-104J aircraft with the first domestically produced F-104J
being completed in January 1960 (Jane’s, 1976). However, the first seven aircraft were again
largely produced in the United States and assembled in Japan (Hall and Johnson, 1968).
A significant amount of learning was transferred to Japan on the F-104J program with
the first MHI produced F-104J taking 25% less man-hours than the first Lockheed F-104
(Hall and Johnson, 1968). Additionally, Japan paid no premium for licensed production
with the F-104J having a lower cost than if they had been made in the United States even
though the F-104J represented a more sophisticated design than the US F-104C (Hall and
Johnson, 1968). The increasing capability of the Japanese aircraft industry can also be seen
by comparing the percentage of value added by MHI on the F-104J program. MHI achieved
an added value of 44.6% compared to an average added value for the leading five US aircraft
firms from 1961 to 1964 of 45.8% (Hall and Johnson, 1968).
This means by the end of the F-104J program Japanese aircraft manufacturing efficiency
was similar to US firms. Additionally, the F-104J program developed supporting industries,
including: Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI) for engines, Mitsubishi Electronics
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Company (Melco) for air-to-air missiles, and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) as an air-
frame subcontractor (Alexander, 1993). In total, the F-104J program used over 21 Japanese
suppliers of components and elements that were also under licensed production with various
US manufacturers (Hall and Johnson, 1968).
4.3. McDonnell F-4 Phantom II
The F-4 was the next US military fighter co-produced in Japan. In November 1968,
Mitsubishi was selected as the contractor for the F-4E (Jane’s, 1976). The F-4 presented
new manufacturing challenges, since it was the first fighter aircraft to make extensive use of
titanium (Boeing, 2000). Japan’s F-4 aircraft co-production agreements included producing
almost 100% of the F-4 airframe, avionics, and engine components in Japan (Todd and
Simpson, 1986). In all, Japan manufactured a total of 138 F-4 aircraft (Jane’s, 1980). The
first two F-4 aircraft were completed in July 1971 and were only assembled in Japan with
production complete in July 1971; the first F-4 produced from parts manufactured in Japan
was completed in May 1972 (Jane’s, 1976). Although the high domestic content of the F-4
produced in Japan shows an aircraft industry with a widespread capability to reproduce
designs, Japan lacked the ability to higher technological capabilities. By the late 1970’s, the
Japanese were aware of their shortcomings and took steps to remedy deficiencies to include
co-production of the F-15 (Lorell, 1995).
4.4. Mitsubishi F-1
The F-1 was Japan’s first attempt at a domestically developed fighter aircraft. In Septem-
ber 1967, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) selected MHI as the prime contractor for
the XT-2 supersonic trainer that was Japan’s first domestically produced supersonic fighter
(Jane’s, 1971). The first flight of the T-2 occurred in July 1971 (Jane’s, 1976). The T-2 was
re-designated the F-1 in November 1976 (Jane’s, 1980), and the first flight for a production
F-1 aircraft was made in June 1977 (Jane’s, 1985). The F-1 program was not considered a
success and although it was developed as an all-weather fighter it was restricted to daylight
due to safety and operational concerns resulting in the production run being cut short with
only 80 aircraft produced (Shear, 1994).
4.5. McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle
The most recent US fighter “co-produced” in Japan was the F-15 aircraft. The first
Japanese produced F-15 rolled off the Mitsubishi assembly line in August 1981—3 months
after the delivery of last F-4 from the same assembly line (Todd and Simpson, 1986). Japan
was the second foreign nation to receive the F-15 aircraft, after Israel, but the only country to
co-produce the F-15 (Sullivan, 1991). Japan bought 209 F-15 aircraft with the last Japanese
produced F-15 rolling off the production line in 1996 (Sekigawa, 2000). The first fourteen
F-15 aircraft were largely assembled from parts shipped from the United States (Sullivan,
1991; Jane’s, 1991).
Chinworth (1992) described US motivations for co-producing the F-15 with Japan as
focusing on security concerns, but, whether intended or not, it also helped boost Japan’s
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industrial capabilities. The potential for technology transfer exceeded the F-86, F-104, and
F-4 programs even though a number of F-15 components were delivered as “black boxes”
(Chinworth, 1992). Interestingly, it was not until December 1984 that the Memorandum
of Understanding was revised for the United States to receive “flowback” technology from
Japan where the US government would be entitled to improvements made to the aircraft
or individual components (Chinworth, 1992). Even though the potential for “flowback”
was recognized it often was not actively sought. Lorell (1995) and Chang (1995) identify
a deficiency of knowledge on the US side about Japanese technology developments and
military R&D that results in part from a lack of apparent interest from the United States.
Additionally, a reluctance by Japan to allow military technology to be exported further
discourages flowback.
4.6. Mitsubishi F-2
The second domestically designed and produced Japanese fighter was the Fighter Support-
Experimental (FS-X). The FS-X represents the first co-development program between
the United States and another nation (Wegg, 1990). After a Congressional battle over
transferring US technology to Japan, approval was given in May 1989 for Mitsubishi
to produce an F-16 derivative aircraft (Wegg, 1990). The FS-X is giving the Japanese
extensive experience in the R&D and systems integration process for developing mod-
ern fighters (Lorell, 1995). Design capabilities and managing the transition from design
to manufacturing are key determinants of success in the aircraft industry (Turnipseed
and Rassuli, 1999), and represents the last level in our technological capability frame-
work.
The FS-X is demonstrating Japan’s capability to develop advanced fighter weapon sys-
tems with changes to over 95% of the F-16 engineering drawings (Lorell, 1995). This makes
the FS-X program a lower risk and less costly means of learning design and integration skills,
while providing further development of its domestic technology and subsystems (Lorell,
1995). The FS-X was renamed the F-2 by Japan and the first delivery from Mitsubishi
occurred on 12 January 1995 (Jane’s, 1998), and the JDA plans to procure 143 F-2 aircraft
through 2003 (Sekigawa, 2000).
5. Case summary
It appears Japan has built a domestic aircraft industry through sequential learning from
foreign technology transfers from the United States, and trial and error design and production
on domestic fighter aircraft. At the same time that it was seeking external knowledge, Japan’s
government deliberately curtailed foreign firm ownership of technology markets to promote
domestic capability (Song et al., 1999). Japan demonstrates significant learning about fighter
aircraft manufacturing with the large decline in the number of aircraft that it assembled from
parts sent from the United States, see Fig. 3. Additionally, the larger production runs of early
licensed production projects indicate an increased opportunity for process refinement.
Fig. 3 shows a declining trend in the number of aircraft Japan merely assembled from
parts shipped from US manufacturers. The significant decline between the F-86 to the









F-86 F-104 F-15 F-2F-1F-4
Fig. 3. Japanese fighter aircraft programs: assembly only aircraft.
F-104 aircraft shows the F-86 helped establish a general aircraft manufacturing capability.
Subsequent assembly appears to be mainly driven by learning specific demands of individual
aircraft designs.
Additionally, the number of years from an aircraft’s IOC in the United States to the first
Japanese production aircraft shows increasing Japanese capability (see Fig. 4). Again the
figure shows Japan is producing the most capable aircraft fielded by the United States only
a few years after they are fielded. This is significant, because most knowledge transferred
in licensed production occurs before production of a first article and takes place in the
exchange of drawings and tooling. The shorter the time between transfers indicates an
increased ability by Japan to absorb more advanced technology.
Additionally, the fighter aircraft technology transfers to Japan occurred faster on av-








F-86 F-104 F-1-F 4 F-15 F-2
Fig. 4. Japanese fighter aircraft programs: years from US initial operational capability to first production in Japan.
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Table 1
Growth in Japanese aircraft industry technological capability
Aircraft model F-86F F-104J F-4EJ F-1 F-15J F-2
Years produced 1956–1961 1961–1965 1971–1981 1977–1987 1981–1996 1998–??
Subsystem
Airframe License License License Domestic License Domestic and
license
Engine Foreign License License License License License





License Domestic License Domestic
Multiple sources.
als from domestic to foreign operating locations (Mowerly and Oxley, 1995). The only
increase in diffusion time occurred with the F-4 can be partially attributed to Japan de-
signing its first domestically produced fighter aircraft, the Mitsubishi F-1.
Producing a domestic aircraft clearly demonstrates an increase in domestic capability;
however, the curtailing of F-1 production indicates Japan recognized it had more to
learn.
Up to and including the F-2, Japan has demonstrated increased defense industry capa-
bility of adapting and creating designs for aircraft subsystems (see Table 1). Mitsubishi,
Fuji, and Kawasaki represent supporting industry capabilities in components, subsystems,
electronics, and instrumentation (Shear, 1994). Similar to fighter aircraft, Boeing has in-
creased Japan’s role in each new commercial aircraft project (Turnipseed
and Rassuli, 1999). While Japan has shown concern toward building a domestic aircraft
industrial base, US prime aircraft contractors reveal few concerns about the im-
pact of the FS-X program and increased Japanese capability on US suppliers (Lorell,
1995).
What level of technological capability does the Japanese aircraft industry possess? Though
the evidence is currently unclear, the optimistic may conclude that Japan still relies on the
United States for systems integration experience and engine technology. For example, the
F-2 has experienced some problems during flight test, including wing flutter, wing cracks
and high loads on the vertical fin, that continue to delay the program (Proctor, 2000; Seki-
gawa, 1998; Sekigawa, 1999). However, problems in developing a fighter aircraft are the
rule and not the exception. The pessimistic may conclude that the United States has given
away the keys to the kingdom (Shear, 1994). For example, Japan may have the ability
to develop stealth aircraft that only the United States has currently operationally fielded
(Lambeth, 1996).
Regardless of the conclusion made about the current level of technological capability
by Japan’s aircraft industry some things cannot be denied. Technology transfers from the
United States have helped progressively build Japan’s technological capability. Addition-
ally, the lead that the United States has held in aerospace technologies is eroding. For
example, between 1990 and 1994 aerospace technologies have produced large, but declin-
ing trade surpluses for the United States (National Science Foundation, 1996) as other
nations including Japan become more competitive.
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6. Discussion
The results of our study reinforce the findings of previous studies and provide insight
into the reasons behind the findings of previous studies may relate to how individual trans-
actions are perceived. The transaction focus of the United States does not appear to have
fully appreciated the learning perspective of Japan and the progression of fighter aircraft
technology transfers has had on developing Japan’s aircraft industry. A learning perspective
is also consistent in Japan’s attitude toward licensing agreements in several areas including
commercial aircraft (Turnipseed and Rassuli, 1999; Turner, 1987, p. 81), television tech-
nology and production (Radnor, 1991), and shipbuilding (Alexander, 1993). Meanwhile,
US governmental policies appear to have focused on technology transfer as an event and
looked at the benefits of supporting an ally, and ensuring compatibility of equipment.
The results of two related studies are worth reviewing. The first is a Government Ac-
counting Office (GAO, 1992) study that made five key findings:
(1) the United States enters into military co-production for defense reasons,
(2) Japan enters military co-production agreements for economic reasons,
(3) the transfer of technology flows one way to Japan from the United States,
(4) military co-production agreements have helped Japan develop and expand its aircraft
industry, and
(5) the United States has not considered the implications of military co-production pro-
grams.
The second study by Pack (2000) attributed the successful industrialization of Asian firms
to differences in three key areas:
(1) rapid acquisition of external knowledge,
(2) ability to utilize knowledge transferred, and
(3) competitiveness of the markets in which products were sold.
Our study’s findings largely agree with previous studies; however, our findings also reveal
a noteworthy exception for each study.
First, in contrast to the GAO (1992) study, the United States has begun to show more
interest in foreign technology and technology from Japan in particular. The United States
first acted to increase the flow of technology from Japan in 1984, when the MOU on F-15
production allowed for “flowback” technology. Additionally, there are signs of progress
in the United States recognizing the value of Asian technology. For example, the Asian
Office of Aerospace Research and Development (AOARD) was established in Tokyo in
1992 (AOARD, 2001).
Second, in contrast to Pack’s (2000) study, Japan’s aircraft industry has not experi-
enced the competitiveness that has helped its other industries become globally competitive.
There are several reasons for decreased competition in Japan’s aircraft industry including
government intervention. Japan’s government has largely regulated the aircraft industry
by eliminating rivalry through work allocation on aircraft projects (Porter et al., 2000).
Additionally, there is a limited market, because Japanese law currently forbids the ex-
port of military equipment (Shear, 1994; Porter et al., 2000). The implication for Japan’s
aerospace industry is that historically over 80% of Japanese aerospace sales were made





















Fig. 5. Japanese aircraft industry expenditures by major category (The Aerospace Industry Yearbook, 1962, 1971,
1977, 1984, 1992, 2000; The Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, Tokyo, in Japanese).
to Japan’s military (Alexander, 1993). Although it has historically been a relatively small
market, Japan’s aerospace industry has shown consistent growth and the share of exports
has increased significantly in the last few years, see Fig. 5.
The historically limited export market for Japan’s military products and related technol-
ogy represents a concern about generalizing our findings. Export of military technology
is prohibited under the “three principles” originally announced by Prime Minister Sato,
in 1967 (JDA, 1994). The principles forbid exports to (1) communist bloc countries, (2)
countries to which the export of arms is prohibited under United Nations resolutions, and
(3) countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international
conflicts (JDA, 1994). The principles were reaffirmed in 1976, when they were extended
to include arms production equipment, and they continue to guide Japanese policy (JDA,
1994). One consequence of the ‘three principles’ is that the concept of dual-use technology
is not well established in Japan where civilian and military applications of technology are
largely kept separate. Any concerns about our study’s findings represent an opportunity for
future research on Japan’s aircraft industry or other nations where aircraft technology trans-
fers occur, such as China, Germany, or Israel. A conservative interpretation of the present
study is that technology transfers to other nations could have larger impacts on developing
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technological capability, and that Japan has developed the potential for a self-sustaining
aerospace industry.
The amount of fighter aircraft technology transferred to Japan may not be as great as
it may first appear due, in part, to special circumstances. For example, Japan’s aircraft
industry remains at least partially dependent on the United States for key technology, such
as engines. Still there are reasons for caution. First, engine technology is available from
other sources. Second, there may be a growing demand for Japan’s aircraft industry in the
civilian sector. For example, the Asian market is expected to represent over 40% of world
aircraft sales in the coming decade (Turnipseed and Rassuli, 1999).
7. Conclusion
Technology transfer in the aircraft industry between the United States and Japan has
occurred. The fundamental motivation for these transfers appears different for each nation,
and is partially the result of viewing the transactions from different perspectives. Under-
standing the viewpoints of nations and how they differ on similar issues is important. The
US perspective has been more transaction based, while Japan’s perspective has been more
learning based and this has implications.
The implications of different perspectives toward technology transfer for policy makers
are two-fold. First, the United States was slow to learn from the Japanese, or realize that tech-
nology transfer is not inherently one-way. Indeed, every nation can gain from international
interchanges of science and technology (Freeman and Soete, 1997). Policymakers in the
United States also appear to ignore longer-term implications of the immediate technology
transfer, and exhibit a continuing need to avoid the not-invented-here (NIH) syndrome.
Second, the Japanese have not been as successful in building an aircraft industry because
it has characteristics that are different from other industries where Japan has experienced
success. However, unique circumstances with Japan should not mitigate concerns about the
impact of weapon licensing agreements with other nations. In conclusion, both domestic
and foreign governmental policies and long-term impacts need to be considered by national
policymakers in technology transfers.
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